Evaluation of the economic impacts of domestic mitigation policies can no longer be made independently of the linkages between these policies and the international framework. However, it is important to disentangle the mechanisms that are themselves independent of the international regimes from those specifically driven by the interplay between these regimes and domestic policies. In addition, the existence of an international framework does not rule out the importance of domestic policies for addressing the specific problems of each country.
This section basically relies on national studies, including integrated economic
regions such as the European Union (EU), but it also reports the results of
multiregional studies for the concerned countries or region.
Table 8.1: List of the models referred to in this chapter | ||
Model |
Region
|
Reference
|
ABARE-GTEM |
USA/EU/Japan/CANZ
|
In Weyant, 1999
|
ADAM |
Denmark
|
Andersen et al., 1998
|
AIM |
USA/EU/Japan/CANZ
|
in: Weyant, 1999
|
Japan
|
Kainuma et al., 1999; Kainuma et al., 2000
|
|
China
|
Jiang et al., 1998
|
|
CETA |
USA/EU/Japan/CANZ
|
In: Weyant, 1999
|
E3-ME |
UK/EU/World
|
Barker 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 1999
|
ELEPHANT |
Denmark
|
Danish Economic Council, 1997; Hauch, 1999
|
ECOSMEC |
Denmark
|
Gørtz et al., 1999
|
ERIS |
|
Kypreos et al, 2000
|
G-Cubed |
USA/EU/Japan/CANZ
|
In: Weyant, 1999
|
GEM-E3 |
EU
|
Capros et al., 1999cvv
|
GEM-E3 |
Sweden
|
Nilsson, 1999
|
GemWTrap |
France/World
|
Bernard and Vielle, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c
|
GESMEC |
Denmark
|
Frandsen et al., 1995
|
GRAPE |
USA/EU/Japan/CANZ
|
In: Weyant, 1999
|
IMACLIM |
France
|
Hourcade et al., 2000a
|
IPSEP |
EU
|
Krause et al., 1999
|
ISTUM |
Canada
|
Jaccard et al., 1996; Bailie et al.,
1998
|
MARKAL |
World
|
Kypreos and Barreto, 1999
|
Canada
|
Loulou and Kanudia, 1998, 1999a and 1999b; Loulou
et al., 2000
|
|
Ontario (Canada)
|
Loulou and Lavigne, 1996
|
|
Quebec, Ontario, Alberta
|
Kanudia and Loulou, 1998b; Kanudia and Loulou, 1998a;
Loulou et al., 1998
|
|
Canada, USA, India
|
Kanudia and Loulou, 1998b
|
|
EU
|
Gielen, 1999; Seebregts et al., 1999a, 1999b;
Ybema et al., 1999
|
|
Italy
|
Contaldi and Tosato, 1999
|
|
Japan
|
Sato et al., 1999
|
|
India
|
Shukla, 1996
|
|
MARKAL-MACRO |
World
|
Kypreos, 1998
|
USA
|
Interagency Analytical Team, 1997
|
|
MARKAL-MATTER |
EU
|
Gielen et al., 1999b, 1999c
|
MARKAL and EFOM |
EU
|
Gielen et al., 1999a; Kram, 1999a. 1999b
|
Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland
|
Bahn et al., 1998
|
|
Switzerland, Colombia
|
Bahn et al., 1999a
|
|
Denmark, Norway, Sweden
|
Larsson et al., 1998
|
|
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland
|
Unger and Alm, 1999
|
|
MARKAL Stochastic |
Quebec
|
Kanudia and Loulou, 1998a
|
Netherlands
|
Ybema et al., 1998
|
|
Switzerland
|
Bahn et al., 1996
|
|
MEGERES |
France
|
Beaumais and Schubert, 1994
|
MERGE3 |
USA/EU/Japan/CANZ
|
In: Weyant, 1999
|
MESSAGE |
World
|
Messner, 1995
|
MISO and IKARUS |
Germany
|
Jochem, 1998
|
MIT-EPPA |
USA/EU/Japan/CANZ
|
In: Weyant, 1999
|
MobiDK |
Denmark
|
Jensen, 1998
|
MS-MRT |
USA/EU/Japan/CANZ
|
In: Weyant, 1999
|
MSG |
Norway
|
Brendemoen and Vennemo, 1994
|
MSG-EE |
Norway
|
Glomsrød et al., 1992; Alfsen et al., 1995; Aasness et al., 1996; Johnsen et al., 1996
|
MSG-6 |
Norway
|
Bye, 2000
|
MSG and MODAG |
Norway
|
Aaserud, 1996
|
NEMS + E-E |
USA
|
Brown et al., 1998; Koomey et al., 1998;
Kydes, 1999
|
Oxford |
USA/EU/Japan/CANZ
|
In: Weyant, 1999
|
POLES |
USA, Canada, FSU, Japan, EU,Australia, New Zealand
|
Criqui and Kouvaritakis, 1997; Criqui et al.,
1999
|
PRIMES |
Western Europe
|
Capros et al., 1999a
|
RICE |
USA/EU/Japan/CANZ
|
In: Weyant, 1999
|
SGM |
USA/EU/Japan/CANZ
|
In: Weyant, 1999v
|
SPIT |
UK
|
Symons et al., 1994
|
SPIT |
Ireland
|
ODonoghue, 1997
|
WorldScan |
USA/EU/Japan/CANZ
|
In: Weyant, 1999
|
CANZ: Other OECD countries (Canada, Australia,
and New Zealand); |
In technology-rich B-U models and approaches, the cost of mitigation is constructed from the aggregation of technological and fuel costs. These include investments, operation and maintenance costs, and fuel procurement, but also included (and this is a recent trend) are revenues and costs from imports and exports, and changes in consumer surplus that result from mitigation actions. In all the studies, it is customary to report the mitigation cost as the incremental cost of some policy scenario relative to that of a baseline scenario. The total cost of mitigation is usually presented as a total net present value (NPV) using a social discount rate selected exogenously (the NPV may be further transformed into an annualized equivalent). Many (but not all) report also the marginal cost of GHG abatement (in US$/tonne of CO2-equivalent), which is the cost of the last tonne of GHG reduced. Chapter 7 discusses cost concepts and discount rates in more depth.
Current B-U analysis can be grouped in three categories:
The boundaries between these three categories is somewhat blurred. For instance, NEMS and PRIMES do include behavioural treatment of some sectors, and MARKAL models use special penetration constraints to limit the penetration of new technologies in those sectors in which resistance to change has been empirically observed. Conversely, ISTUM has recently been enhanced to allow the iterative computation of a partial equilibrium (the new model is named CIMS).
Several studies go further: they are based on partial equilibrium models in which energy service demands are sensitive to prices. Therefore, even the quantities of energy services may increase or decrease in carbon scenarios, relative to the base case. For these models report not only the direct technical costs, but also the loss or gain in consumer surplus because of altered demands for energy services. The results of this new generation of partial equilibrium B-U models tend to be closer than those of other B-U models to the results of the general equilibrium T-D models, which are also discussed in this chapter. Loulou and Kanudia (1999) argue that, by making demands endogenous in B-U models, most of the side-effects of policy scenarios on the economy at large are captured. When a partial equilibrium model is used, the cost reported is the net loss of social surplus (NLSS), defined as the sum of losses of producers and consumers surpluses (see Chapter 7).
As is apparent from the results presented below, considerable variations exist in the reported costs of GHG abatement. Some of these differences result from the inclusion/exclusion of certain types of cost in the studies (e.g., hidden costs and welfare losses), others from the methodologies used to aggregate the costs, others from the feedback between end-use demand and prices, and still others from genuine differences between the energy systems of the countries under study. However, the most significant cause of cost variations seems to lie not only (see also Chapter 9) in methodological differences, but in the differences in assumptions. Finally, although most recent B-U results consider the abatement of a fairly complete basket of GHG emissions from all energy-related sources, a few essentially focus on CO2 abatement only and/or on selected sectors, such as power generation. In this chapter, only results are reported that have sufficient scope to qualify as GHG abatement costs in most or all sectors of an economy.
To facilitate the exposition of the various results, the rest of this subsection
is divided into four parts, as follows:
Other reports in this collection |