In a rational world, the ultimate level of climate and thus GHG concentration
stabilization would emerge from a political process in which the global community
would weigh mitigation costs and the averted damages associated with different
levels of stabilization. Also weighed would be the risks of triggering systemic
changes in large geophysical systems, like ocean circulation, or other irreversible
impacts. In reality, the political process will inevitably be influenced by
the distribution of positive and negative effects of climate change, as well
as by the costs of mitigation among countries, largely determined by how risks,
costs, environmental values, and development aspirations are weighed in different
regions and cultures. This process will be strongly influenced by new scientific
and technical knowledge and by experience gained in making and implementing
policy. The climate change literature contains a diversity of arguments as to
why either a low level or a relatively high level of stabilization is desirable
(IPCC, 2001b).
Given the large uncertainties that characterize each component of the climate
change problem, it is impossible to establish a globally acceptable level of
stabilized GHG concentrations today. Studies discussed in this section and summarized
in Table 10.11 support the obvious expectations that
lower stabilization targets involve exponentially higher mitigation costs and
relatively more ambitious near-term emissions reductions, but, as reported by
WGII (IPCC, 2001b), lower targets induce significantly smaller biological and
geophysical impacts and thus induce smaller damages and adaptation costs.
| Table 10.11: Selected studies on global mitigation
costs for different stabilization targets |
 |
| Study |
Scenarios & dimensions |
450ppmv |
550ppmv |
650ppmv |
750ppmv |
850ppmv |
Notes |
|
| Nordhaus and Boyer (1999) RICE-98 |
billion 1990 US$ |
|
|
|
|
|
discounted (d) back to 1950
IAM |
| net impacts on global welfare |
|
335.00 |
|
|
|
| difference from base (=0) |
|
|
|
|
|
| mitigation |
|
459.00 |
|
|
|
| reduction in cl.damage |
|
794.00 |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Valverde and Webster (1999) MIT-EPPA 1.6 |
in billion 1985 US$ |
|
|
|
|
|
1985-2100, 5 year time steps
d= 5% |
| 500a global emissions path |
|
(500ppmv) |
|
|
|
| all nations equal % abatement |
|
|
|
|
|
| OECD: no trade |
|
272.50 |
|
|
|
| OECD: trade |
|
272.40 |
|
|
|
| Non-OECD: no trade |
|
216.30 |
|
|
|
| Non-OECD: trade |
|
216.20 |
|
|
|
| Global: no trade |
|
488.90 |
|
|
|
| Global trade |
|
488.60 |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Manne and Richels (1999b)
MERGE 3.0 |
billion of 1990 US$ |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Kyoto followed by arbitrary reduc.
|
|
2400.00 |
|
|
|
consumption loss through 2100
d=5% to 1990 |
| Kyoto followed by least-cost |
|
900.00 |
|
|
|
| least cost |
|
650.00 |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Tol (1999c), FUND |
percentage of world income, median |
|
|
2.1% |
|
|
average annual income loss
9 regions, 5 sectors in 2100 |
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Ha-Duong et al. (1997)
DIAM |
percentage of 1990 GWP |
|
|
|
|
|
d=3%
average annual costs period 2000–21000 |
| inertia of 50 years |
1.1% |
|
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Lecocq et al. (1998)
STARTS |
percentage |
|
|
|
|
|
average annual costs period 2000-2100 differential
inertia in sectors |
| abatement costs as consumption loss |
|
|
|
|
|
| compared to BAU in |
|
|
|
|
|
| A: flexible sector |
|
1,5% |
|
|
|
| B: rigid sector |
|
0.4% |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Yohe and Wallace (1996) Connecticut |
percent of GWP as costs |
|
16.40 to 16.69 |
5.94 to 7.09 |
2.84 to 4.24 |
1.59 to 3.05 |
d, expected present value 7 scenarios |
| in 1990, no benefit side |
|
|
|
|
|
| one percentage point is |
|
|
|
|
|
| ~210 billion US$ |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Dowlatabadi (1998) ICAM-3 |
percentage of GDP as costs |
|
0.05 to 0.48 |
|
|
|
period: 2000–20025 sequential learning framework
mitigation costs for the USA and Canada only |
| mitigation costs within 9 scenarios |
|
|
|
|
|
| with different technical change in |
|
|
|
|
|
| energy sector |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Richels a. Edmonds (1995)
Global 2100 & ERB |
percentage of GWP as costs |
(400) |
(500) |
|
|
|
d=5%
stabilization in 2100
Global 2100
Manne/Richels
ERB: Edmonds-Reilly-Barns (1992) |
| Sc:500a: follow BAU through 2010 |
|
Gl 2100: 0.6 %; ERB: 0.7%
|
|
|
|
| Sc: 500b: between 500a & stab. |
|
Gl 2100: 0.9 %; ERB: 0.95%
|
|
|
|
| Sc: Emission stabilization at |
|
Gl 2100: 1.15 %; ERB: 1.1%
|
|
|
|
| 1990 level |
Gl: 0.9%; ERB:1.1% |
Gl:0.6%; ERB: 0.7% |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Plambeck, Hope (1996)
PAGE95 |
in trillion US$ |
|
|
|
|
|
d= 5 %, 1990-2200
further scenarios not listedhere, e.g., non-linear etc. |
| BAU + 100 GtC |
2.50 |
|
|
|
|
| BAU |
2.20 |
|
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Yohe and Jacobsen
(1999) Connecticut |
trillion 1990 US$ |
|
|
|
|
|
d= 3 % through 2100
(Ramsey)
cost study in terms of deadweight loss, no opt
A: alt. sink specifications
B: alt. emissions targets for 2010 |
| annual control costs of 7 sc |
|
|
|
|
|
| Minimum cost: Sc3 to Sc7 |
A: 10.13 to 44.40 |
A: 2.11 to 16.12 |
A: 0.36 to 7.24 |
|
|
| Cost with Kyoto: Sc3 to Sc7 |
A: 10.47 to 47.04 |
A: 2.12 to 16.19 |
A: 0.40 to 7.26 |
|
|
| Minimum cost minus 10 % emis. |
B: 10.13 to 44.40 |
B: 2.11 to 16.12 |
B: 0.36 to 7.24 |
|
|
| Cost with Kyoto minus 10 % |
B: 10.40 to 46.77 |
B: 2.13 to 16.16 |
B: 0.42 to 7.28 |
|
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Manne (1995)
MERGE |
trillion 1990 US$ |
(415 ppmv) |
|
|
|
|
d= 5 % to 1990 |
| global damage |
1.90 |
|
|
|
|
| benefits of stab. as reduced dam. |
2.50 |
|
|
|
|
| costs of stab. |
18.50 |
|
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Manne and Richels (1997) MERGE 3.0 |
trillion 1990 US$ |
|
|
|
|
|
d= 5% to 1990
1990- 2100
non- market and market damages |
| WGI: w/ o where flex. |
14.20 |
9.00 |
5.00 |
3.00 |
|
| WGI: with where flex |
7.00 |
4.00 |
2.00 |
1.2 |
|
| WRE: w/ o where flex |
5.50 |
2.00 |
1.00 |
1.00 |
|
| WRE: with where flex |
3.50 |
1.00 |
0.6 |
0.50 |
|
| least cost: with where flex |
|
0.60 |
|
|
|
| WGI: Annex- 1- trade |
|
5.90 |
|
|
|
| 10% cut in 2010: A- 1- trade |
|
2.30 |
|
|
|
| WRE: A- 1- trade |
|
0.90 |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Tol (1999d), FUND 1.6 |
trillion net present costs in US$ |
|
|
|
|
|
5% through 2050
damage per year in billion US$: 216 |
| WGI: no trade |
|
17.5 |
10.50 |
|
| WGI: trade |
|
8.0 |
4.00 |
|
| WRE: no trade |
|
16.0 |
10.00 |
|
| WRE: trade |
|
4.0 |
2.00 |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Tol (1999a) FUND 1.6 |
in trillion US$ |
|
below 550 |
|
|
|
d= 5% per year to 1990
consumption losses p.a. period 1990- 2200 |
| Minimum Cost |
|
2.4 |
|
|
|
| Min. Cost meeting Kyoto, trade |
|
3.1 |
|
|
|
| Min. Cost meeting Kyoto |
|
3.7 |
|
|
|
| 2 % reduction, intern. trade |
|
4.0 |
|
|
|
| meeting Kyoto, trade |
|
4.4 |
|
|
|
| meeting Kyoto, no trade |
|
14.6 |
|
|
|
|
